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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LITTLE COTTONWOOD WATER 
COMPANY, a corporation, and 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
VS. 
SANDY CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, MIDVALE CITY, a municipal· 
corporation, and J 0 S E P H M. 
TRACY, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
\ 
i 
't. 
/ Case No. 7898 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
. The respondents concur with the statement of the case 
contained in the ·appellants' brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' brief contains, in the staten1ent of facts, 
various statements which do not take into account all of the 
testimony and evidence presented at the trial, and many state-
ments which are argumentative rather than pure statements 
of fact. The respondents feel constrained, therefore, to pre-
sent herewith their own statement of the facts presented at 
the trial of the case. 
The Little Cottonwood watershed presents ·several unique 
features. It is a canyon in the Wasatch Mountain Range "·hich, 
in its latest geological development, has been influenced prin-
cipally by glacial action. The course of the canyon is relatively 
straight from east to west, and it inclines steeply in its westerly 
cours~. The bottotn of the canyon is filled with a glacial de-
posit, which readily absorbs and transmits water. During the 
greater part of every . year • all of the surf ace flow of Little 
Cottonwood Creek is appropriated. During the late Fall and 
Winter months, all of the surface flow reaching the point 
described on the various exhibits and in the testimony as the 
((Murray Power Plant Intake" is diverted by means of a con-
crete dam into a pip·eline which carries such surface flow 
beyond the mouth of the canyon and through the Murray 
1
Sity 
Power. Plant. The glacial moraine is crossed at a point n~ar 
the mouth of the canyon by a fault commonly known and 
referred to as the (CW asatch Fault." 
It is acknowledged by all of the persons appearing 111 
this matter that the decree of the District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the case of Union and East 
Jordan Irrigation. Company v. Richards Irrigation Co1npany, 
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et ~ , Case No. 4802, con1monly referred to as the tCMorse 
Decree," determines the surface rights of the appropriators 
of \\~ater in Little Cotton\vood Creek as of the date of the 
entry of the decree June 16, 1910. It is furthr acknowledged . 
by all concerned that the decree referred to defines the rights 
of the appropriators of 303.57 sec;ond feet of the flow of Little· 
Cottonwood Creek. It is nowhere stated in the Decree or in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the said case 
that there is no unappropriated water in the stream or in the 
Little Cottonwood Watershed. The decree merely defines the 
rights of appropriators to that date and certainly does not 
fo~~close the possibility of any additional appropriations being 
made. As a matter of fact, it is conceded by the parties to this 
action that during certain · seasons the · surface flow of Little 
Cottonwood Creek exceeds 303.5 7 second feet, and that the 
exc~ss over that amount remains unappropriated. It has also 
been shown by the expert witnesses for all. of the parties to 
th's action that there is a substantial quantity of water which 
flows or percolates through the material filling the bottom of 
Little Cottonwood Canyon toward the west, crosses the 
Wasatch Fault and continues to flow underground and ap-
pa~ently forms a part of the underground water in the Salt 
L 1{e Valley. This is clearly brought out by the testimony of 
the appellants' expert witness, Dr. Marsell (R. 127, 133 and 
13 7) and by the testimony of Mr. Ward of the State Engineer's 
Office (R. 53, 54, 55 and R. 193, 194). As far as the parties to 
this action are concerned, this water which leaves the confines 
of the canyon and flo,vs underground across the Wasatch 
I 
Fault, and thence into the valley, appears without contradiction 
to be unappropriated water. It is clearly not included within 
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the terms of the Morse Decree, and it appears equally clear 
that none of the parties to this action claims to be an appro-
priator of this water . 
. We therefore submit, as an uncontroverted fact borne 
out by the testimony of witnesses for all parties concerned in 
this action, that there are at least two supplies of unappropriated 
water in Little Cottonwood Canyon consisting first of water · 
in the surface stream in excess of 303.57 second feet which, 
during certain seasoQs, is not diverted and flows down the 
natural w~ter course to Great Salt Lake, and second, of a con-
tinuous and substantial flow under the surface of the ground, 
across the . Wasatch Fault, and into the underground supply 
of Salt Lake Valley. The appellants. seek to place great stress 
upon the fact that the source of the water which respondents 
seek to appropriate is not shown. We contend that the source 
of the unappropriated water is immaterial, and the only fact 
of importance ·in this proceeding is the fact that the water 
exists and is unappropriated. 
The peculiar feaures of the Little Cottonwood watershed 
and the fact that during a major portion of each year the sur-
face flow of Little Cottonwood Creek is entirely diverted at 
the Murray. Power Plant Divesion Dam through a tight pipe-
line, furnishes us with a unique opportunity to make a study 
of the water, both underground and at the surface, below the 
point of such diversion and concurrently therewith. Each of 
the respondents, Midvale City and Sandy City, has drilled a 
well in the Despain Springs area. The location and nature of 
these wells, together with the location and nature of other 
features of the area ·which are necessary to the consideration 
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of this case, are graphically portrayed on Defendants, Exhibit 
1. The respondents, after the wells had been drilled and tested, 
'vere of the opinion that hitherto unappropriated water could 
be appropriated and diverted by means of the wells, and ac-
cordingly filed the application for appropriation which is the 
subject of this action. 
The action of the State Engineer was by no means hasty 
or ill considered upon the application of the respondents. On 
the contrary~ as stated by Mr. Ward (R. 53), the State Engi-
neer and his staff. considered the matter very seriously over a 
period of more than ten years, and required the respondents 
to submit more information in support of the application than 
would normally be required (R. 62). 
In the Fall of 1944, a series of tests were commenced 
\vhich were planned and designed to make possible a thorough 
and scientific study of the water ·in this area ·by all parties 
concerned. All of the parties to this action were notified of 
j 
the tests and were given the oportunity to observe all of the 
procedures followed by the respondents and to make such 
independent tests and observations as they might choose to do. 
According to the evidence, representatives of the appellants 
\vere fully informed as to the procedures followed and observ-
ed the entire proceedings of the respondents during the course 
of tqe tests for the ensuing several months. In addition to 
observing all activities of the respondents in this area, the 
appellants secured the services of Dr. Marsell to make inde-
pendent examinations, to which he .has testified. 
It was conceded by all concerned that the pumping of the 
wells had an immediate and direct affect upon the flow of 
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various springs in the adjoining area into the channel of Little 
Cottonwood Creek. One of the unique conditions, ho\vever, 
\vhich 1nade these tests possible is the fact that Midvale City 
and Sandy City, during the time ~hen all of the surface flow 
of Little Cottonwood Creek is diverted at the Murray Power 
Plant Dam, are the owners of primary water rights in excess 
of the total amount which naturally flows to the surface fron1 
seeps and springs below the said dam. With the exception of 
the North Despain Ditch and the Granite Water Company, 
the respondents are entitled, during these periods, to the use 
of the entire surface flow of the creek. Therefore, subject only 
to supplying the rights of the North Despain Ditch and the 
Granite Water Company, the respondents, to the extent that 
they were drying up the creek, were merely using a ne\v means 
of diverting their primary \Vater rights. The right so to do has 
been granted by the State Engineer and affirmed by the District 
Court upon appeal. 
The tests were carried on under the supervision of the 
State Engineer from November, 1944, through April, 1945. 
During this period of time, the wells _were alternately pumped 
separately and together· so that observa'tions_ could be made. 
of the affect upon the water in the area of pumping both 
\vells together, . pumping either one separately, and failing 
to pump either. 
The respondents, during this period of time, maintained 
a system of measuring weirs by means of which they could 
measure the flow of water· in Little Cottonwood Creek and 
the various contributing sources from the point belo\v the 
Murray Power Plant Diversion Datn \Vhere water first naturally 
occurs in the channel of the creek to the head of the Sandy 
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Ditch, '"here during all of these periods, the last of the appro-
priated \Vater is diverted. During the months mentioned, fre-
quent and regular measurements wer~ made of the flow of 
\Vater at these various \veirs. The record of these measurements 
is graphically portrayed in Defendants' Exhibit 2. During 
the same period of time, Dr. Marsell placed a series of pegs 
in the creek channel and other points where the water naturally 
occurs in the area, whereupon he n1ade regular periodic measure-
ments of the \Yater level. As stated by Dr. Mars ell, this was not 
a test of the quantity of \Vater but was described as an Hinter-
ference test" to determine the extent to which the pumping 
of the wells interfered with the natural occurrence of surface 
water in the area. 
The results of the two tests appear to corroborate each 
other in most particulars. 
As a result of these examination·s, and as more particularly 
appears from the various exhibits on file herein, the following 
facts can be drawn: 
L When either of the two wells mentioned is pumped, 
there is a lowering of the water, table in the immediate vicinity 
of the wells, and an immediate decrease in the flow of water 
from the springs in the area of the wells into the channel of 
the creek. This effect continues for a number of days after the 
pumping of such \veils commences and then appears to de-
crease, or "level off." The pumping of both wells contempo-
raneously has more effect upon the water table and flow of the 
springs than the purnping of either \Vell separately. The 
pumping of either well has an immediate effect upon the level 
of the \Vater in the other well. 
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2. The continuous pumping of the wells during about 75 
days of the period during which the tests were carried on 
resulted in a yield of vvater approxitnately 0.6 c.f.s. in excess 
of the amount which the springs and other sources \vere yield-
ing naturally before the commencement of pumping. 
3. The pu1nping was carried on during a period \vhen 
normally the water table and the flo\v of water in the creek 
channel would be gradually diminished. 
4. The pumping lo"rered the level of water at all points 
\vhere pegs were driven by Dr. Marsell. The effect upon the 
pegs \vas first observed in from 10 to 2 70 minutes after the· 
pumping commenced, and the· \Vater completely disappeared 
from the surface at the pegs in from 1 to 28 days. 
5. The pumping of the wells decreases the flow of spring 
water into Little Cottonwood Creek in and below the Despain 
Springs area within a tnatter of minutes after the pumping is 
commenced. The decrease in the flow of these springs continues 
for 5 or 6 days, and then the effect of the pumping seems to 
disappear or become very much less noticeable. 
6. When the pumps are shut down, the water reappears 
at the ground surface at the locations of the pegs placed by 
Dr. Marsell in from 4 hours to 8 days. 
7. Upon the termination of pumping, the flow of various 
. springs in the Despain Springs area into Little Cottonwood 
Creek is resumed and increases sharply within periods ranging 
from a few minutes to a few hours. Thereafter, within a few 
Jays the flow of these springs is substantially as high, or 
higher, than when the pumping is commenced. When the 
10 
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putnping is terminated, the flow of the Granite Water Com-
pany's spring increases \vithin a period of 4 or 5 days. 
Mr. Richards and Mr. Ward are both of the opinion, 
after their exhaustive research in the area, that the pumping 
of the 'vells diverts 'vater which would otherwise flow under-
ground across the Wasatch Fault~ Dr. Marsell is of the opinion 
that the pumping of the wells does not have an effect so 
'videspread that it affects the wat_er flowing across the Wasatch 
Fault. He testified, however, (R. 152, 153) that the wells 
in question might be drilled to a sufficient. depth and pumped 
in sufficient quantity to interrupt the underflow of the stream 
and substantially diminish the quantity of water escaping 
through. the fault. There is a difference of opinion between 
Mr. Richards and Mr. Ward, on the one hand, and Dr. Marsell 
on the other hand, as to whether or not the amount of water 
w'ithdrawn by the present wells is sufficient to divert the 
\Vater which would otherwise remain unused and unappro-
priated, · but they agree that at least by deepening the wells 
and enlarging the pumping capacity this water can be diverted. 
Dr. Marsell also expresses the opinion that a part of the 
un\vatered area created by the pumping . of the wells must 
be restored by the first water overflowing the Murray Power 
Plant Diversion Daf!I and flowing. down the surface channel. 
l-Iis own experiments, as well as those conducted by others, 
show, however, that within a very short time after the termi-
nation of the pumping, water appears at the surface of the 
creek channel at the furthermost and uppermost points at 
which it occurred naturally prior to the pumping. He has re-
peatedly stated in his testitnony, and it is reiterated in the 
1 1 
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appellants' brief, that water cannot possibly appear at the 
surface of the ground until the gravel and other tnaterial 
underlying the surface is completely saturated. · 
Dr. Marsell stated in his testimony (R. 75) that his first 
investigation of the water in Little Cottonwood Canyon was 
in February, 1945, and (R. 128) that he has made no investi-
gation of the flow of water at the Granite Springs and is not 
familiar with the springs. It appears that the entire area of 
his investigation is that within which he has placed his pegs 
and made measurements thereupon. These pegs are all \vithin 
the Despain Springs Area, and they all showed the same 
effect. His conclusion as to the effect of pumping the v.:ells 
beyond these pegs is based entirely upon hypothesis. 
Dr. Marsell conducted an experiment. whereby he placed 
some water and gravel in a glass beaker and withdrew some 
\Vater therefrom by means of a pipette. He attempted to draw 
an analogy between this condition and the water naturally 
occurring in Little Cottonwood Canyon. However, he testified 
(R. 134) that the condition in Little Cottonwood Canyon is 
not analogous to a closed vessel but that it is a trough open 
at one end through which the water flows and out of which 
the water discharges, both at the surface and underground. 
It is also stated (R. 13,7) that he has tnade no measurement 
of the volume or rate of flow of the underflo,v of Little 
Cottonwood Creek. 
~lfr. Ward and Mr. Richards have testified that they have 
been actively engaged in observing and working \vith the 
\Vaters of Little Cottonwood Canyon continuously for n1any 
years. 
12 
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Other statements and assertions made by the appellants 
in their ~tatement of facts are argumentative and will be 
dealt \vith in our argument hereinafter contained. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
RELATIVE RIGHTS CONCERNING THE ADJUDI-
CATION OF THE WATERS OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD 
CREEK ARE NOT AT ISSUE, AND THERE IS UNAPPRO-
PRIATED WATER IN THE PROPOSED SOURCE. 
POINT II.· 
WATERS PROPOSED TO BE CAPTURED ARE UN-
APPROPRIATED AND NOT PART OF SURFACE OR SUB-
SURFACE ~/ATERS SUPPLYING LITTLE COTTON-
WOOD DECREED RIGHTS. 
POINT III. 
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT THERE 
\X! AS UNDEVELOPED AND LOST WATER WITHIN 
THE AREA IN QUESTION. 
POINT IV . 
. THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
THE WATER CAPTURED IS NOT OF FULLY APPRO-
PRIATED SOURCES. 
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POINT V. 
EXHAUSTIVE AND PRACTICAL QUANTITY TESTS 
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE RESULTS OF -WHICH 
CONCLUSIVELY SHOW UNAPPROPRIATED \Y/ AT.ER~ 
A.RE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT 1'HE APPROVAL OF 
i\.N APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE WATER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RELATIVE RIGHTS CONCERl'TING THE ADJUDI-
CATION OF THE WATERS OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD 
CH.EEK ARE NOT AT ISSUE, AND THERE IS UN APPRO~ 
PRIATED WATER IN THE PROPOSED SOURCE. 
Virtually all of the argument contained in the appellants' 
. brief is based upon the rna jor pretnise that the Morse Decree, 
v.; hich adjudicated water rights . in Little Cottonwood Cr~ek 
as of June 16, 1910, amounts to an adjudication that there is 
no. unappropriated water in the Little Cottonwood Watershed. 
It becomes immediately apparent that this is not the ca~e, and 
that the major premise of the appellants' entire case fails. 
, The parts of the Morse Decree quoted in appellants~ brief 
in support of this contention. are as follows: 
"Paragraph 35. No one is entitled to. any of the 
water of Little Cottonwood except as he may be an 
owner in some of the ditches to which water is dis-
tributed, and then only as such ditch is entitled to 
water as herein found." 
· "Paragraph 42. All persons who have any interest 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the wtaer of Little Cottonwood have been duly 
served and have either pleaded herein or the time to 
plead has elapsed; and no one has any right to such 
water except as specified in this decree." 
HParagraph 3 5" saying that no one is entitled to such 
\Vater except as therein specified, means only that no one is 
the O\vner of such \Yater except as so specified. ('Paragrpah 
42" also refers only to the ownership of water. An exa~ina­
tion of the decree certainly discloses no holding to the effect 
that there is no \Vater except as described in the decree, and 
such a holding in an action of this character would be improper. 
To further point out_ the fallacy of the appellants' posi-
tion, the court has judicial knowledge of several instances in 
which applications to appropriate water in Little Cottonwood 
Canyon subsequent to the date of the Morse Decree have 
been approved. The case of Whitmore v. Murray _City, 107 
Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748; Little Cottontvood Water Company 
v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, and Whitmore v. Welch, 
114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954, are all cases wherein applications 
to appropriate \Vater in Little Cottonwood. Canyon have been 
approved by the State Engineer and the approval has been 
affirmed by this court. The appellants herein are jointly inter-
ested in an application to appropriate 3 second feet of water 
\vhich they claim to save by the diversion of water through the 
Murray City Power Plant pipeline. The record of this appli-
cation appears from the exhibits in the instant case. Certainly, 
if, as the appellants so earnestly contend, all of the \Vater in 
Little Cottonwood Creek and in the entire watershed tributary 
thereto \Vere deemed to have been appropriated as of the 
date of the Morse Decree, these subsequent applications could 
15 
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not have been approved. The evidence of all of the expert 
witnesses for both parties to this action shows . conclusively, 
without controversy, that· there is water which flows under-
ground through the area where the wells are drilled, and 
escapes across the Wasatch Fault into the underground basin 
below and which, for the purpose of this action, is unappro-
priated. The evidence further shows conclusively, and \vithout 
controversy, that there are times when the surface flow of 
Little Cottonwood Creek exceeds the total water decreed to 
have been appropriated by the terms of the. Morse Decree. 
The appellants attempt to point out that the results of 
the decision in the instant case affect vvater rights in canyon 
streams from Colliston to Nephi. If this were true, such result 
\vould not necessarily be undesirable. The policy of the law, 
as stated by our Legislature and in numerous cases by this 
court, is to encourage the development and appropriation of 
water, and the application thereof to . a beneficial use. The 
only question presently before this court, however, is the 
respondents' application to appropriate 1 second foot of water 
in Little Cottonwood Canyon. The appellants are pursuing 
their right to appeal to your Honorable Body as set forth in 
Title 100.-3-14, 15, U.C.A., 1943. This court, in Eafdley t'. 
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 76 P. 2d 362, said: 
((When an appeal is taken . from the decision of 
the state. engineer in such a case, the trial court is re-
quired to determine the same questions de novo. It 
determines. whether the application should be approved 
or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties 
beyond the determination of that matter. The issues 
remain the same upon an appeal to this court. All 
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that the district court or this court, on appeal fron1 
the district court, is called ~pon to do is to determine 
'vhether the application ·should be rejected or ap· 
proved.'. 
1~o this effect, see Tanner l'. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 
957; Jf7hitmore l'. i11urray City, supra, which were reaffirmed 
again by the recent decision of United States L'. District Court 
of Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, et al., 
238 P. 2d 1132. 
The respondents readily admit the authenticity of the 
Morse Decree, have been bound by it in the past, and expect 
to continue to abide by the terms therein. (Exhibit 3, R. 13, 16). 
\V e readily concede that the State Engineer cannot remove 
vested rights which have been previously established. How-
ever, the problem of priorities between appropriators applies 
only to vested rights and not to the right to appropriate water 
in the future. In this respect, we refer you to Tanner v. Bacon, 
supra, wherein the court said: 
CCThe statute relating to prtorthes between appro-
priators applies only to vested rights and not to the 
right to appropriate water in the future, which latte.r 
right is governed by statute relating to the approval 
of application, and hence every person who applies 
for unappropriated water does not have under the 
doctrine of priority, an unqualified right to have such 
application approved. n 
To follow appellants' theory concerning the Morse Decree, 
or like .decrees, would forever foreclose future applications 
for the development of new water anywhere within the geo-
graphical confines of a stream of water. This, of course, 1s 
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absurd and to pursue such a policy would repeal all the sound . 
\Vater law that has been established before and after statehood. 
It has been the policy for many, many years to enco~rage new 
applications. In one of appellants' own cases, namely, Little 
Cottonwood Water Company v. Kimball, supra, the court said: 
·'In an arid region water is precious, and it is the 
undoubted policy of the law to prevent its \vaste and 
promote its largest beneficial use. * * * The legislature 
did not intend to vest the power in the state engineer 
to determine the relative rights of an old appropriation 
against a new appropriation. That is a question which 
involves intricate and difficult problems of both law 
and fact and its determination is particularly a judicial 
function. The state engipeer n1ust in general inquire 
into the extent of prior rights but he ·does not have 
the facilities to do more than inquire in a· very general 
way. Since the policy of the law. is to prevent waste 
and promote the largest beneficial use ne\v applica-
tions should be favored and in a doubtful case ~hould 
be approved.'' 
To this effect see also Peterson, et al. t/. Lund, 57 Utah 162, 
193 P. 1087. 
This court has noted in previous cases that the filing of 
an application and the making of an appropriation are not 
one and the same thing. To this effect see Wrathall v. Johnson! 
86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755; Sowards, et al. z·. l\1eagber, 3·7 Utah 
212, 108 P. 1112. 
The court as recently as December 21, 1951, in Amet'ican 
Fork Irrigation Co., et al. v. Linke, et al., 239 P. 2d 188, said: 
"A judgment reversing State Engineer's order deny-
ing application for change of use of appropriated 
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irrigation water \vill not be reversed on ground that 
proposed change \vould invade vested rights of other 
than applicants, as a remedy is available, if applicants 
interfere with or diminish such rights in executing 
plan, particularly where trial court approved applica-
tion subject to and without prejudice to other's rights 
and awarded no vested rights, but simply allowed ap-
plicant to proceed with plans specifically conditioned by 
court on respecting other's rights." · 
See also Rot:ky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 
104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108; Eardley v. Terry, supra; Little 
Cottonll'ood Water Co. t'. Kimball, supra, and United States 
l'. District Cottrt of Fourth District, et al., supra. 
An appropriator of the waters of a river or lake does 
not have the exclusive right to manage and control the use 
of all the water in the lake or flowing in that river. Such water 
is publici juris, and others have the same right to use it as 
the appropriator so long as they do not interfere with the ap-
propriator's use. See Salt Lake City and Salt Lake Canal Co. 
ll. Salt Lake City Water and Electrical Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 
67 P. 672. 
POINT II. 
WATERS PROPOSED TO BE CAPTURED ARE UN-
APPROPRIATED, AND NOT PART OF SURFACE OR 
SUBSURFACE WATERS SUPPLYING LITTLE COTTON-. 
WOOD DECREED RIGHTS. 
The appellants in their argument under Point II commence 
by stating the fallacious rna jor premise that all of the natural 
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fio\v of the creek is appropriated, and go on to attempt to show 
that the natural flow of the creek is all of the water in the 
\vatershed. 
The respondents have not atten1pted, at any point in this 
case, to define the natural flow, the surface flow, or the sub-
surface flow of the creek, and do not attempt now to do so 
because we deem any such definition immaterial to the issues 
herein. 
An examination of the Morse Decree will clearly show, 
however, that it defines the rights of persons who have diverted 
and appropriated the s."trface flow of Little Cottonwood Creek 
by rneans of. open ditches. All of the rights defined therein 
are appropriations of water ntJ.turally occuring at the surface 
of the ground. No reference is made therein to appropriations 
of ttnderground water. Since the date of the entry of the Morse 
Decree, the conditions which then prevailed have been altered 
principally by the fact that the appellants and others have, 
during a part of each year, diverted all of the surface flow 
of the stream through the Murray Po'vver Plant pipeline and 
syphoned the water so diverted into the Sandy Ditch below 
the n1outh of the canyon to satisfy the rights of appropriators 
defined by the Morse Decree. Also, since 1910, our concepts 
of the nature of underground water and our laws relative 
thereto have undergone several important changes. These 
changes are represented and illustrated by the enactment, in 
1935, of the law comn1only referred to as the ((Underground 
Water Law," and which has been codified as Section 100-5-12, 
U.C.A., 1943, and othe.r: sections relative thereto. The respond-
ents introduced a copy of the Morse Decree in evidence to 
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inform the court as to the exiJting Jttrfat.:e rights in Little Cot-
ton,vood Creek. r\s hereinbefore pointed out, any question of 
conflicts between appropriators is not a proper issue in this 
case. The appellapts argue that the surface flo,v and the under-
flo'" are indistinguishable. Here, however, we have a condition 
"·here the surface flow is entirely diverted and the underground 
_,vater is no l.onger Hunderflow" because there is no surface 
flow to be supported thereby. The uncontradicted evidence clear-
ly shows that a part of the underground water flowing down 
the canyon finds its way to the surface of the creek. in seeps 
and springs, but that the rna jor part of it crosses the Wasatch 
Fault underground and is lost in the underground basin below. 
The authorities cited by the appellants deal entirely with. 
cases involving a conflict between respective appropriators of 
\Vater. There is no such issue before this court. See American 
Fork Irrigation Company, et al., v. Ljnke, et al., supra. 
Let us analyze the case of Richards lnv. Co. v. Westview 
Inv. Co., relied upon by the appellants in their brief at pages 
28-29, wherein reliance is placed upon the following: 
·· * * * Any appropriator of water from the central 
channel is entitled to rely and depend upon all the 
sources· which feed the main stream above his own 
diversion point, clear back to the farthest limits of 
the watershed." 
What is the fact situation in the case at bar and how does it 
compare in respect to the case above relied upon by the 
appellants? We respectfully subrnit, and such cannot be re .. 
futed, that results of the investigations and measurements 
made by the respondents, which were very ably, completely, 
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and graphically presented by Defendants' Exhibit No. 2, as 
-vvell as the rest of the evidence adduced, definitely and clearly 
show that no one except the respondents and Sandy Irrigation 
Company ( rtot a party to this suit) , has the right to divert 
\Vater between the Murray Power Plant pipeline intake at the 
Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the Sandy. Ditch, and that the 
respondents are the only ones able to divert water between 
these points. This was admitted by appellants and was stipu-
lated to by them at the trial (R. 14_, 15, 16). Your attention 
is respectfully invited to the fact that during the major portion 
of the year-namely, approximately from September-·October 
to April-all of the creek flow is diverted into the Murray 
Power Plant pipeline (R. 30, 45, 62, 70, 194). The State 
Engineer's records bear this out and, of course, Your Honorable 
Body can take judicial notice of such records. 
It will be noted from the State Engineer's records and 
from the judgment of the trial court (R. 217) that the re-
spondents are able· to ascertain this additional water only 
during the period when all of the flow is diverted into the 
pipeline at the Whitmore Oxygen Plant (when the creek is 
dry, R. 45), or when the creek exceeds the decreed rights. 
This being true, how can the appellants complain of inter-
ference where no one else has right of diversion? During this 
period (R. 16, 45), the entire normal flow of water is divertecJ 
and a tight dam maintained at the Sandy Ditch (R. 81, 82, 84). 
. . 
Therefore, no one except the respondents is entitled to any 
\Vater out of the creek during this period. Furthermore, De-
fendants' Exhibit No. 2 shows that during the above :mentioned 
period, even. with pumps going and with the natural se~pagc 
of the creek, the total decreed rights of the respondents and 
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Union and Jordan Irrigation Cotnpany (who shares a pipeline 
\Vith respondents) cannot uniformly be delivered at the Sandy 
Ditch (R. 36, 45). It only stands to reason that if the respond-
ents are interfering with anyone we are interfering with our .. 
selves. Ho\vever, it \vas conclusively shown by the evidence 
. that during this period the respondents, through their pumping 
of the wells, could deliver more water at the Sandy Ditch 
than could be delivered there by natural means (Exhibit No. 2, 
R. 30, 31, 38, 41, 54, 141, 197, 211). 
To permit us to prove on our application for appropriation 
of additional water certainly cannot be construed as legal 
sanction given us to take watet; from underground source by 
n1eans of a pretext. Certainly the records show that additional 
\Vater was captured (Exhibit No. 2, R. 30, 31, 34, 38, 41, 54, 
62, 141, 161) and appellants do not attempt to· refute such 
absolute evidence but quite on the contrary adduce only a theo· 
retical geological lesson unsupported by data that proves abso · 
lutely nothing. Appellants' own witness testified that their 
evidence rested on theory and supposition (R. 176). 
If the area in question is like a (!big tub," as outlined by 
appellants, then water will be released only ~here holes are 
made, and if no holes are made in the tub, then the water 
\vill escape over the fault (R. 63·, 205), and be lost in the 
valley below. This is admitted by appellants (R. 137, 141, 
143, 147, 161, 162, 197). Why not tap it, bring it to the sur-
face and save it? However, the watershed cannot be likened 
· to a closed vessel, as set forth in the appellants' beaker experi-
tnent, because it has a poroLiS opening over the fault and the 
old canyon creek channel to the south of the Beaver Pond 
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Springs, wherein water continuously escapes into the under-
ground basin below. This is supported by Dr. Marsell's testi-
mony (R. 134, 193). 
POINT III. 
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT TI-IERE 
\\//' S UNDEVELOPED AND LOST WATER WITI-liJ'\ 
THE AREA IN QUESTION. 
The appellants seek to lay great emphasis upon the fact 
that the- respondents have not tra·ced the source from ·which 
the claimed water comes. The source of the water above the 
respondents' point of diversion is entirely immaterial in this 
case. It was held in W afren lfrigation Company v. Chafleton, 
et al., 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, that it was no defense to 
plead th,~.t the water that the defendants were ta~ing was 
wat~r belonging to an appropriator whose rights were senior 
. to the. rights of the plaintiff, for the plaintiff would have 
been entitled to the water if the senior appropriator allowed 
it to . run past his point of diversion. In this respect see also 
Fuller, et al., v. Sharp, et al., 33 Utah 431, 94 P. 813 .. The 
only question before the court is whether or not there is un-
appropriated water at the location of the wells where 've 
propose to. divert it. The argument presented in the appellants· 
Point III is merely a repetition of the matters which have been 
presented by them in Points I and II. This argument has been 
answered 1n the respondents' previous points, or will be 
answe.red in subsequent discussions. 
Appellants again cite cases pertaining to relative rights 
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of parties \\·hich have no bearing on the case at bar. We desire 
to point out that the case of Silver King Con. l\1in. Co. z·. 
Sutton, cited by appellants on page 31 of their brief, is a quiet 
title suit case. which is not the fact of this case. Respondents 
claim no other interest in adjudicated rights than what they 
already have; furthermore, the instant case is not a suit in 
equity as the above cited case relied upon by appellants. Cit-
ing from appellants' own case at page 684 of 39 P. 2d: 
''This being a suit in equity it is our duty to examine 
the evidence, determine its weight and reach our own 
conclusion with respect thereto bearing in mind, how-
ever, the rule so often announced by this court that the 
findings of a trial court will not be. disturbed unless 
we are of the opinion they are against the clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence.'' 
In this respect, see also Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 
284 P. 457. Certainly after many years of exhaustive tests, 
approval by the State Engineer, and approval by the District 
Court, it cannot now be said that we have not met our burden. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THA 1~ 
THE WATER CAPTURED IS NOT OF FULLY APPRO-
PRIATED SOURCES. 
Appellants allege that the record does not support the 
Findings of the court and that the trial court has made certain 
conclusions. In such a suit, the District Court performs de novo 
the same functions as the State Engineer performs. The issues 
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to be tried are exactly the satne as they were before the State 
Engineer. To this effect, see Eardley t/. Terry, supra, \vherein 
the court said: 
''When an appeal is taken from the decision of the 
State Engineer in such a case, the trial court is required 
to ~etermine the same questions de novo. * * * The 
issues remain the same upon an appeal to this court." 
In determining whether or not an application should be 
approved, the issues are outlined by Section 100-3·-8, U.C.A., 
1943. This section provides: 
((It shall be the duty of the State Engineer * * * to 
approve an application, if ( 1) .there is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source; ( 2) the proposed use 
will not impair existing rights or interfere with the 
more beneficial use of the water; ( 3) the proposed 
plan .is physically and economically feasible; ( 4) the 
applicant has the financial ability to complete the pro-
posed works and the application was filed in good faith 
and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly." 
Requirements numbers 3 and 4 do not appear to be at issue 
and therefore are not worthy of much comment. In passing, 
let us say that we have the physical and economical means to 
develop this . proposed appropriation, the wells are already 
there, have been pumped for over 10 years, and measurements 
have been made. over a long period of time. Certainly one 
cannot say that two small cities with growing pains have 
filed this application for speculation. 
In determining whether there is unappropriated \Vater, 
and \vhether the rights of others 'vill be interfered ,vith, the 
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Sup~etne Court has, on nun1erous occasions, defined the show-
ing \\·hid1 must be made by the applicant. In one of the more 
recent opinions, lY/ bitrnore z·. Welch, supra, the court said: 
HFurthermore, our holdings are uniformly to the 
effect that if there is unappropriated water in the 
proposed source, an application to appropriate should 
not be rejected. In Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. 
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P 116, 118, we held that 
the state engineer should approve an application to 
appropriate water unless * * * it clearly appears that 
there is no unappropriated water in the proposed 
source * * * But if the question is fairly doubtful 
and there is reasonable probability that a portion of 
the waters are not necessary to supply existing rights 
the engineer should have the power to approve the ap-
plication and afford the applicant the opportunity 
for ~n orderly recourse to the courts, who ·have the 
facilities and power to dispose of the matter definitely 
and satisfactorily." 
·· * * * since the policy of the law is to prevent 
\vaste and promote the largest beneficial use of water 
new appropriation (applications) should be favored 
and not hindered. In a . doubtful case when the con· 
elusion is not clear, it is more consistent with sound 
policy and with the general sch~me of the law, to 
approve the application to appropriate and afford the 
new claimant the legal status and the opportunity to 
proceed * * * ." 
The doctrine of this case was stated in Rocky Ford Irrigation 
Co. z·. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., supra, and reaffirmed again 
in Lehi Irrigation Co. ·v. Jones, et al., 115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 
892. 
In the Eardley v. Terry case, supra, the court said: 
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qlt seems clear to us that the Legislature intended 
that when the application is filed, the state engineer 
is called upon to determine preliminarily vvhether 
there is probable cause to believe that an application 
can be -perfected, having due regard to whether there 
is unappropriated water available for appropriation, 
whether it can be put to a beneficial use, and whether 
it can. be diverted and so used without injuring or con-
flicting with the prior rights of others. If he determines 
there is such probability, the application is approved 
and the applicant then proceeds to demonstrate by an 
actual use of the rights sought to be acquired that he 
is entitled to such rights., 
The mere fact that an application, filed and literally fol-
lowed through_to proof, might pl~ce the applicant in a position 
where he· could interfere with other prior . rights, is not grounds 
for rejecting an application. See Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. ~·. 
Kents" Lake Reservoir Company, supra, and Whitmore v. Welch, 
supra. In the Whitmor~ case, th~ court quoted Section 100-3-3 
which in effect states that change applications shall not be 
rejected for the sole reason that the change might impair vested 
rights -in others, etc._ The court then says: 
· «]fa change application must not be rejected merely 
because there might be some conflict with vested rights, 
·it would seem to follow that an original application 
should- not . be rejected when there is unappropriated 
water and the only conflict is with the r~spect to the 
point of return." 
It is not necessary at the application stage of the procedure 
to appropriate ·water for the applicant to know every detail 
of his final· right. He may file on 2 second . feet of water, not 
knowing whether he can appropriate anywhere near that much. 
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The application is approved, and he proceeds to demonstrate 
what can be appropriated without interfering with others. 
\\'hen his final proof is submitted, his certificate n1ay issue for 
only 1 of the 2 feet applied for. In this respect, see Salt Lake 
City. et al., v. Gardner. et al., 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147. Be also 
may find that particular diverting works are not adequate, 
that a "~ell must be drilled deeper than contemplated, that a 
pipeline must be substituted for a natural channel or a dirt 
ditch. His application is never rejected simply because these 
details are unkno,vn at the beginning. The application should 
be approved as filed, even though the State Engineer does not 
believe that the entire amount applied for can be perfected. 
Thus, in Little Cottonwood z;. Kimball, supra, the court said 
that an application should be approved if there was ((any 
unappropriated water in the proposed source." Also, in Whit-
nzore v. Welch,. supra, the court had before it a power filing. 
The applicant had asked for a large segment of the stream 
taking the water out at one point and returning it at another. 
If the application had to finally be approved for the exact 
q~antity of water and exact segtnent of the stream applied for, 
it would have been necessary to reject it. This is so, because 
the point of return \vas so far dov\''nstream that it interfered 
\Vith other upstream rights. The court, nevertheless, affirmed 
the State Engineer in approving the application, because upon 
final proof the water right could be cut down to cover only 
that which was available for appropriation. In the instant case, 
no upstream or do\vnstream rights \vill be interfered with. 
This has been proven. 
In Eardley v. Terry, supra, the court pointed out that the 
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application is not intended to be a final determination of the 
water right. The court, in this regard, said: 
tfWere Section 100-3-8, R. S. 1933,, to be considered 
. by itself, it might be thought that in determining 
\vhether an application to appropriate water should 
be approved or rejected, the state engineer, and the 
district court upon an appeal from the state engineer's 
. decision, should proceed to hear and dis pose of the 
matter and .impose upon the applicant the satne bur-
dens as if it were making a final disposition of all 
questions growing out of the filing of the application. 
But section 100-3-8, supra, does not stand alone. Sec-
tions 100~3-16 and 100-3-17 must be considered in 
connection therewith. By those sections it is clear 
that no final rights are acquired until the proof re-
quired by section 100-3-16 is made and a certificate has 
been issued by the state engineer. Section 100-3-16 
contemplates that the works, by \vhich the \Vater ap-
plied for is to be put to .use, must be completed and 
the water applied for must be put to a beneficial use 
before a completed appropriation giving rights to the 
use of the water can be effected. It is also clear that 
the original approval of the state engineer has no 
efficacy except that it shows that the applicant had 
the right to proceed with his application." 
There is sufficient evidence available to demonstrate be-
yond doubt that there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
water right can be perfected and this certainly is admitted 
by the appellants (R. 137, 141, 143, 147, 161, 162). Time 
for submitting proof of appropriation can be extended by 
the State Engineer for as much as 50 years from the date an 
application is approved, Section 100-3-12, U.C.A. 1943, as 
amended. 
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During the ensuinb years, additional n1easurements and 
·study can be tnade so as to kno\v \\' ith altnost mathematical 
exactness the quantity of ,,·ater \vhich can be developed through 
pun1ping. in addition to that \vhich \Vould have been available 
through natural conditions. The respondents, by their testi-
n1ony and through the exhaustive experiments, have shown 
this in great detail. 
The Supreme Court has for many years recognized that 
\Vater \vhich is \Vasted ·by nature is unappropriated; and that 
persons \villing to construct the necessary works to save the 
\Vater _which nature wastes, may appropriate it. Cases going 
back as far as 1916 have recognized this principle. Thus, in 
Big Cottonzcood Tanner Ditch Conzpany v. Shurtliff, et al., 
49 Utah 569, 164 P. 856, the court said that where a user is 
\vasting water due to a defective or wasteful method of con-
veyance, another user can improve his methods and himself 
ues the water thus saved. See also Salt Lake City, et al., v. 
Gardner, et al., supra. 
In 1903 in the case of Howcroft v~ The Union Jordan Irriga-
tion Company, 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487, the court said that a per-
son who seeks to save water by piping it across a porous area. 
must, in order to sustain his right to watet saved, prove that said 
waters were actually lost to prior appropriators. To do this 
\Ve can show that said waters would not run above the surface 
at a point above the prior appropriators' point of diversion. 
The evidence sho\vs that the waters which are pumped from 
the wells would not reappear in the channel above ·the diver-
sion point of the Sandy Ditch. This was admitted by appellants' 
own \\'itness (R. 137, 141, 14}, 147, 161). Without pumping 
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little water accumulates in the creek and reaches the Sandy 
Ditch, \vhereas actual careful measurements over periods of 
titne show that there can be pumped at least 0.6 cJ.s. more 
than would reach the Sandy Ditch by natural means, (Defend-
ants' Exhibit No. 2, R. 22-50) and at no time even by pumping . 
could we dry up the creek channel cotnpletely (R. 38). Thus 
by allowing the . water to stay . in the underground, it is not 
possible to get all of it. A considerable part of it is lost over 
the fault area. Much of it simply will not come to the surface. 
Existing wells and pumping equipment can, however, greatly 
increase the quantity of -water _which can be brought to the 
surface above the Sandy Ditch (R. 22-50, 54, 141, 147, 211). 
If the diversion works at the Sandy Ditch are interferred w"ith 
in any way, the matter can be amply handled by replacemen~. 
Salt Lake City has already gone · on record before the 
. State Engineer as believing that immediately above this area 
-between the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the South Despain 
Ditch-as much as 3 c.f.s. is lost in the channel and can be 
saved (Defendants' Exhibit No. 9). It has also gone on record 
by its application~ that imn1ediately belo~r the Sandy Ditch 
over 3 c.£ .s. sinks into the channel and never again reappears 
in the surface stream above the point of diversion. It apparently 
denies that the immediate strip loses .any water. The evidence 
very emphatically demonstrates that it does; that by pumping 
these underground sources through devel~pme~t · of wells, 
water which would not otherwise be available for use by any-
one is brought to the surface and can be place to beneficial use. 
We respectfully call your attention to Defendants' Exhibits 
10, 11, 12, 13, and 1.4. An analysis of these exhibits indicates 
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the very inconsistent policy t1ken by appellant, Salt Lake 
City. Exhibits 10-1.1, inclusive, are ans,vers to protests received 
\\·hen Salt Lake City filed to appropriate 5 c.f.s. (Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 9) between the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and 
the South Despain Ditch. The appellant, Salt Lake City, in 
ans,ver to the protests of Little Cottonwood Water Company 
and Union and Jordan Irrigation Company (Defendants' Ex-
hibits 10-12, inclusive), said: 
ttThat the water feeding the springs and seeps which 
supplies part of the primary flow of the creek, is not 
the same \Vater that is sought to be appropriated under 
this application. This fact is evident because the water 
from said springs is much colder than the creek water 
during the summertime and flow from said springs 
and seeps is practicaly constant while that of the creek 
varies with the result that the loss in the channel varies 
without affecting the springs; furthermore, the amounts 
of water flowing from ·said spring and seeps is much 
more than that lost in the streambed which further 
substantiates the fact that these waters are unrelated.·' 
Salt Lake City, in ans\ver to the protest of Sandy City, Midvale 
City, and the Sandy Irrigation Company (Defendants' Ex-
hibit i3), said: 
«<That the applicant (meaning Salt Lake City) hereby 
claims that the water which issues in the form · of 
springs below the point of diversion of the South De-
spain Ditch (meaning Despain Springs) is not the 
same water that is lost in the channel outlined in the 
application, but claims that these springs, \vhich un-
questionably contribute. to the primary flow of said 
creek, are fed by water from other sources. That this 
fact is substantiated by residents in the vicinity of 
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these springs and further by the fact that the flo\v frorn 
said springs is comparatively steady while the streatn 
flow fluctuates; furthern1ore, during the sumn1ertin1r~ 
the water from the springs is colder than that ·of the 
creek and· the flow from the springs is much more than 
that of the seepage loss, which tends to further sub-
stantiate the claim that these \vaters are unrelated.'' 
(Italics added.) 
Yet Salt Lake City, in their protest against the respondents' 
application (Defendants' Exhibit No.8), said: 
''That the protestant (meaning Salt Lake City) main-
tains and believes that some of the said water now 
being lost ~y seepage is the same water that applicant 
proposes to pump from wells under this new appli-
cation." (Italics added.) 
To say the least, ·these positions taken by the appellant, Salt 
Lake City, are ce~tainly diaiJ:?.etrically opposed. Are ·we to be 
so naive as to believe that the appellants can save 3 c.f.s. be-
tween the Whitmore Oxygen Plant and the South Despain 
Ditch and can save below the Sandy Ditch and yet that there 
is no additional water to be. captured between the South 
Despain Ditch and the Sandy Ditch? Most certainly not. 
It is only necessary, under the cases noted above, for the 
applicant to sho"v that there is reasonable ground for believing . 
that an appropriation can be n1ade. Cases 'vhere persons saved 
vvaters wasted are Little Cottontvood W ctter Co. v. Ki1nball. 
supra, and Yates v. Newton; 59 Utah 105, 202 P. 208. In the 
Nevtton case, it appeared that plaintiffs diverted all of the water 
from a canyon or creek which had a gravelly bed and the plain-
tiffs argued that the evidence showed that there was no water 
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running to \Vaste in the canyon. The argun1ent \Vas that any 
effort on the part of the defendant to conserve or gather waters 
\vhich seep into the gravelly bed of the stream v.'ould interfere 
'vith the rights of the plaintiffs. The court held that only by 
experimenting could it be determined whether or not water 
could be conserved and if the defendants wanted to try to 
conserve the water they were entitled to do so. 
Appellants, at page 34 of their brief, allege that no evi-
dence was adduced to show where the additional water came 
from and also allege that the water captured by respondents 
would reappear in the channel at the Sandy Ditch, a distance 
of 6400 feet. A check of Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 will show 
this distance to be not over 5,000 fe~t. It is very evident from 
respondents' Exhibit No. 2 and testimony given by Mr. Rich-
ards, Mr. Ward and by appellants' own witness, Dr. Marsell 
(R. 22-50, 62, 63, 137, 141, 143, 147, 161, 162) that the 
water captured is water that would escape into the valley 
west of the fault area if not taken out above, and therefore 
it was impossible for the water captured to be part of the 
water that might appear at the Sandy Ditch. Furthermore, 
we definitely showed that the. water taken was the escaping 
water because the voids arid spring area were recharged almost 
immediately (R. 40, 49, 161, 190), and therefore were not 
necessary for surface carrier water. 
Exception is taken to the statement by appellants ( appel-
lants' brief, page 3 5) that the pumping adversely affected the 
\Vater supply reaching the Sandy Ditch. This statement is abso-
lutely false and an analysis of Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 will 
emphatically refute such contention. More water was de-
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
livered at the Sandy Ditch at all times when the pumps were 
operating than when they were not. 
The appellants attack the validity of tests made by engi-
neers for the respondents. These tests were made by Mr. 
Richards, who has dealt prirnarily with water and water courses 
and has been very familiar with water conditions in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon for the past 50 years (R. 17, 18, 19), 
and under the supervision of Mr. Ward, who has studied and 
worked with water in the State of Utah for over 20 years, 
a large part of which work has been conducted in Little Cotton-
wood Canyon (R. 60, 201). Appellants rely heavily on the 
testimony concerning the peg test conducted under the super-
vision of Dr. Marsell. Let us look at this test .for a moment. 
You have the true facts that all of the surface flow is being 
diverted through the pipeline and the only wa~er which is in 
the creek from the Whitmore Oxygen Plant to the Sandy 
Ditch is a minute amount that seeps or percolates therein, 
and the fact that no one else but the respondents can divert 
water between these two points. Further, you have the fact 
that pumping and exhaustive experiments, by the respondents, 
took place during. months when no water was in the creek. 
, What more ideal situation could exist (R. }0, 70) ? During 
the winter months there is a normal seasonal fluctuation 
'vherein the surface beds will normally dry up. The evidence 
adduced by the respondents very emphatically showed that the 
recovery rate of the well voids and seepage was almost instant-
aneous (R. 40, 47, 48,. 149) and this was not refuted but 
acquiesced in (R. 129, 132, 141, 156, 190), thereby indicating 
the capture of water that never \vould come to the surface. 
Exhaustive tests \vere made by respondents, which included 
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the entire area fron1 the \veils to the Sandy Ditch (Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 2). Tests \vere tnade over n1any years (R. 38, 49, 
61) \Yith one \vell pun1ping, then t\\'O wells pumping. Many 
weirs \vere installed, results \vere charted and measurements 
taken between given points (R. 22-50). All of this was done 
at great expense to the respondent (R. 202). All the appel-
lants did \Yas to place pegs a few inches in the streambed 
around the \Yells. No other measurements of any kind were 
shown. This is evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Marsell 
(R. 138, 171, 193, 194, 195). No measurements or tests were 
made by the appellants to refute the tests of the respondents. 
No measurements were taken of the flow over the various weirs 
all down the creek to the Sandy Ditch. Then how can appel-
lants, in good conscience, say that the respondents' tests are 
of no value? Admission was made by Dr. Marsell that recovery 
of the voids created by pumping was very rapid when the 
pumps stopped and the only exception that" could possibly 
be taken is that some of the pegs were not re-covered with 
water. We, of course, submit that this condition was a normal 
seasonal fluctuation. The seepage of the creek bed is not _lhe 
same daily throughout the year and the water in the creek 
normally goes down during the time when the appellants 
made their tests (R. 27, 33, 34, 35, 49, 62, 138, 156, 206). 
lfo,v can anyone say that the underground water moves at 
a rate of 2 feet per day without more tests? Can anyone see it? 
Is the source of supply in any given area the same 200 feet 
away? How can anyone say that the subsurface material is 
the same aU· over within a given area? One need only look at 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 and R. 190 to see that . this is 
not true. There is a rocky bed approximately 900 feet in length 
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just a short distance west of the Despain Spring Area which 
is of different formation than. the Spring Area and the rest 
of the area. This area has an actual loss of water (R. 42). 
Also, there are natural losses and fluctuations all down the 
creek (R. 43). By way of cotnparison, appellants' testimony 
revealed no facts that were not explained and plainly illus-
trated by respondents' exhibits which were the results of 
careful and accurate measurements of the flow of creek water 
above and across the Wasatch Fault area. Except for some 
observations and measurements of the elevation of water 
surfaces as they appeared in one shallow well immersed in a 
corrugated pipe, and in a few places along the creek where 
water accumulated and ran down the channel and in soine 
spots ponded up to a depth of about one foot, the appellants 
produced no factual evidence that is helpf~l in determining 
the actual amount of water that Little Cottonwood Creek 
does or can yield under various conditions. A very interesting 
theory of prehistoric water erosion and glacial action in the 
canyon, and even other canyons, was given stating that below 
the present streambed from the Whitmore Oxygen Plant to 
the Wasatch Fault there now e~ists a deep glacial and water 
deposit of material, estimate.d to be 200 to 300 feet deep, and 
that this body of material rests on bedrock; that during the 
time when there is enough water flowing in the creek to entirely 
saturate or fill the voids in this great" mass of material up to 
the level of the creek bed the water will appear in the creek 
channel; that the Murray Power Plant Dam is constructed 
· on top of this uncompacted tnaterial of great depth, and an 
unknown amount of _water is running under it tending to fill 
the voids. in · the deposit between there and the Wasatch 
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Fault; that the ground \Vater surface produced by this sub-
surface flo,v is practically parallel to and slightly below the 
botton1 of the creek v.r hen all of the water flow in the creek 
at the Murray Plant pipeline is div~rted therefrom; that the 
hydraulic grade of this ground \Vater surface outcrops at the 
Despain Springs area and against the Beaver Pond Springs 
and that all the subsurface \Vater which does not appear at 
these points disappears into the Wasatch Fault. 
This is of course an interesting description of an· un-
demonstrated condition. Appellants' main. witness testified 
that no other tests were made than tlie peg tests (R~ 171, 193, 
194). No sample of the earth, no evidence of the depth of 
the bedrock is produced. No evidence was produced as to 
the depth of the cart yon fill, the actual amount of . water flow-
ing beneath th~ surface of the ground, the nature of water 
movement, or the portion of the water flowing underground 
which appears at the surface in the above mentioned spring 
area. Whether these spring areas ·yield 1070 of the under-
ground flow or 907o of the underground flow, we are not 
informed. Without more evidence than these hypotheses it 
would appear difficult for the court to determine that the State 
Engineer's Office and the other respondents, after many years 
of study of the problem as it actually occurs on the ground, 
and the trial court after hearing the evidence, have erred in 
deciding that there is a reasonable cause to believe that 
there is some unappropraited water in the underground source. 
No evid~nce has been produced that the Midvale and 
Sandy \veils are not drilled to bed rock or that at any point 
across the canyon the bed rock is much· deeper than these 
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wells. This same course of reasoning is_ applicable to any 
and all points up and down the_ canyon until evidence to the 
contrary is produced. If there is a deep deposit of tnaterial 
in the canyon and a great body of water passing through it, it 
is possible that a considerable portion of this water is following 
along the bed rock and disappears in the fault area. In that 
case, from a conservation standpoint, it should be brought to 
the surface at a higher elevation than the. bottom of the valley 
and put to use. Upon this .theory the wells were drilled and 
more water has been made to flow by use of the pumps than 
otherwise would. The additional water thereby obtained is 
intended to be used by the respondents for the highest· duty 
to which water can be put, natnely, culinary use. This has been 
demonstrated during the past 10 years (R. 38, 49, 62), and 
the State Engineer has required very much more proof than 
·it normally does for the approval of an application, as evi-
denced by Mr. Ward's statement (R. 62). The respondents 
have been patient in asking for its use while appellants con-
tinue to use the water we have pumped pending said approval. 
At the present time, the respondents are in great need of the 
additi~nal. \Vater and they desire to continue their proof of 
appropriation. Certainly, we have met the burden for an ap-
proval of the application at this stage. 
POINT V. 
EXI-lt\USTIVE AND PRAC'fiCAL QUANTITY TESTS 
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE RESULTS OF WI-IICH 
CONCLUSIVELY SHOW U:t'\TAPPROPRIA TED \VATER, 
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ARE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE APPROVAL OF 
AN APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE WAT.ER. 
An analysis of appellants' Point V shows that the appel-. 
lants in this point, like in every one of their other four points, 
argue on the premise that this lawsuit involves the determin-
ation of relative rights rather than whether or not there is 
reasonable cause to believe that there is unappropriated water 
\vithin the area. They have drawn unfair inferences and con-
clusions not based upon the facts and evidence. 
Appellants assail t~e findings and the judgment of the 
trial court and its reasoning in affirming the State Engineer's 
decision. In reply to such a ridiculous attack, we refer to the 
last two paragraphs of the trial court's memorandum decision, 
as follows: 
"The Courts of this state have consistently held that 
original applications for appropriation of water should 
be freely granted whenever a reasonable probability 
exists that further development of water resources can 
be made. The public policy of the State being such, the 
views of the court as expressed herein must be inter-
preted accordingly." 
"Let judgment be entered in accord with the de-
cision of the State Engineer.'' 
In attacking the judgment of the trial court the appel-
lants have destroyed their own major premise. As previously 
pointed out, the entire argument of the appellants is based 
on the contention that all of the water in Little Cottonwood 
Creek, including all water occurring in the watershed to its 
uttermost limits, is appropriated under the terms of the Morse 
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Decree. In appellants' brief, at page 39, they say, CCWe have 
no doubt that if wells were dug at or immediately above the 
fault they could capture some water that had fully performed 
its service to prior appropriators up the creek and so could be 
taken without injury to anyone." 
If this be true, then such water is unappropriated \Vater 
within the confines of Little Cottonwood watershed. 
The evidence clearly shows that during the period \vhen 
the tests were made, the area 'vas not acting as a carrier of sur-
face water. The only water in the creek channel was a sn1all 
part of the underflow which reached the surface and which 
belonged entirely to the respondents. Appellants had diverted 
all of their water above the sprin~s. By the same reasoning 
then, this "'ater, which no longer acts as a carrier, is unappro-
priated water. 
The appellants ask who is capable of measuring the con-
tribution of water to the underflow of the stream. Our answer 
i.s that we, through exhaustive tests, over a period of many 
years, under the supervision of competent hydraulic engineers, 
have measured it. The results of our measurements are in evi-
dence. Also, we ~ave made. it possible for the appellants to 
measure it. All of the tests show that, upon cessation of pump-
ing, while the creek above is still dry, water appears in the 
. springs within a few minutes. and covers the surface of the 
area in lengths of time ranging from 4 hours to 8 days. The 
appell~nts insist that water cannot appear at the surface until 
the underlying n1aterial is completely saturated. The various 
exhibits of both parties show exact measurements as to tin1e. 
As far as quantity is concerned, we have made precise measure-
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ments of the quantity of water which can be taken from the 
area by our present means. This evidence is clear and uncon-
troverted. 
Most of these matters are not at issue in considering an 
application to appropriate water. Our proof has gone much 
. further than the law requires. These detailed measurements 
properly relate to proof of appropriation. 
All witnesses agree that there is water crossing the Wasatch 
Fault and excess flood water in the area which is ll:nappro-
priated. The respondents have drilled wells and made careful 
scientific examinations for ·many. years. They have found that 
they can develop and place to beneficial use a measured quan-
tity of water. No interference has· been shown. This, then, 
is the development which the appellants after examination 
limited in scope and area, covering a period of 75 days, label 
as an ctimpractical scheme." 
We have not OI)ly borne the burden of proof, but have. 
gone far beyond to inform the court fully. Upon the basis of 
the appellants' evidence alone, the application should be 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The tests performed by the respondents under the direc-
tion of the State Engineer were exhaustive, were more than 
required by the. usual applicant, were performed during the 
most ideal period possible, and were performed in an area 
\vhere no other appropriator, except one not a party to this 
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suit, has any diversion points. 'Ihis is indicative that if any 
interference takes place, it is with ourselves. A tight dam is 
tnaintained at the Sandy Ditch during this period 'vhich is 
indicative that no interference could possibly be made with 
either an appropriator above the South Despain Ditch or below 
the Sandy Ditch. There is a natural loss. of water within the 
tested area, as is evidenced by the loss in the 900 foot rocky 
formation just west of the Despain Spring Area. The rate 
of recharge to the Despain Spring Area was almost itnmediate 
with the stopping of the pumps, all of which took place "rhen 
the entire creek flow was diverted east of the area in question. 
It is, therefore, submitted that applicants need only show 
reasonable cause for believing that an appropriation might 
be made, that it is not necessary for them to ·prove that the 
exact amount applied for can be obtained; nor to know every 
detail of the appropriation. Those details will be known by 
the time proof of appropriation is submitted. The application 
is simply a notice of intention. If approved, as it should be, the 
applicant is permited to go forward to perfect a right. · The 
application should not be rejected merely because they might 
be· placed in a position where they can interfere with rights 
of others, which we deny will take place. The evidence clearly 
demonstrates that nature will not bring all of the water accu-
nlulating in the areas in question to the surface. This ~s ad-
mitted by the appellants. Both above and below this area the. 
protestants are attempting to work out projects to save the water 
which nature wastes. By extensive developm~nt works in the 
form of. wells and pumps, some water can be brought to the 
surface which otherwise would r€main underground and not 
be available at any of the protestants' points of diversion. 
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LTnder the cases and the evidence, the State Engineer's and 
the Trial Court's decision should be readily affinned and the 
applicants permitted to proceed to perfect their rights. 
We apologize to this Court for '"hat the Court may well 
regard as a too lengthy brief with unnecessary repetitions and 
citations. Our excuse is that the several points advanced by 
the appellants to sustain their position are, at least in part, the 
cause of supererogation in dealing 'vith them. 
·Respectfully submitted, 
VICTOR G .. SAGERS, 
Attorney for Defendant and · 
Respondent, Sandy City 
BEN G. BAGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent,_ Midvale City 
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